Most information governance problems in data programmes are architecture problems that were left to the governance team to solve at the end.
The pattern that avoids the largest share of them is pseudonymisation at source. It is well documented, it is not new, and it is still skipped — usually because it is seen as a compliance step rather than a design decision. Patterns I designed on this basis have been running in live NHS services for more than a decade.
What it means
Identifiers are replaced with pseudonyms at the point the data leaves the source system, before it reaches the analytical platform. The key that would let you reverse it stays with the source, held separately, under different access control. The analytical environment never holds identifiable data at all.
The distinction that matters is where it happens. Pseudonymising on arrival into the warehouse — which is what most implementations actually do — means identifiable data has already crossed the boundary, been logged, been backed up, and landed in whatever staging area the pipeline uses.
Why it changes the governance conversation
- The DPIA gets simpler. You are assessing a flow that does not carry identifiers, rather than arguing about controls on one that does.
- The risk surface shrinks to something you can describe. A breach of the analytical platform does not expose identifiable records.
- Data minimisation stops being an assertion. It is structurally true, and you can demonstrate it to an auditor in the architecture rather than in a policy document.
- Re-identification becomes an explicit, controlled act. Where clinical care genuinely requires it, that is a deliberate authorised step with its own audit trail — not the default state of the platform.
Where implementations go wrong
The pseudonym is derived from the identifier without a secret. A plain hash of an NHS number is reversible by anyone who can generate hashes of candidate numbers. It needs a keyed function with the key held separately.
Consistency is not thought through. If you need to link the same person across sources or over time, the pseudonym has to be stable and consistent across them. That is a design decision with real consequences, and retrofitting it is painful.
The key ends up in the same trust boundary. If the key is held by the same team, in the same environment, under the same credentials as the pseudonymised data, you have documentation of separation rather than separation.
Free-text fields are forgotten. Structured identifier columns get handled; clinical notes containing names and addresses go through untouched. This is the most common failure I see.
If you are retrofitting
Most organisations are not starting clean. The sequence that works: map the flows and find where identifiers actually cross the boundary; fix the highest-volume flow first to prove the pattern and the linkage design; move the key out of the analytical trust boundary; then work through the tail. Do not try to do all flows at once, and do not start with the politically hardest one.
If a data-sharing or analytics programme has stalled on information governance, it is often this. Get in touch.

